



coalition theory network

24th conference



Conference venue: Maison de la Recherche, 29, avenue Robert-Schuman, 13100 Aix-en-Provence

Thursday, May 16th

8:30 > 9:00 am Welcoming coffee and registration

9:00 > 10:00 am **Keynote Lecture #1**
Adam Szeidl, Central European University
Direct and Indirect Effects of Financial Access on SME

Chair: Yann Bramoullé, AMSE
> Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

10:00 > 10:30 am *Coffee-break*
> Salle de colloque 1 (ground floor)

10:30 > 12:30 pm **Parallel Sessions A**

Empirics of Social Interactions

Chair: Giulio Iacobelli - Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

Daniel Chen, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse
Ideas Have Consequences: The Impact of Law and Economics on American Justice

Diego Battiston, Stockholm University
The Persistent Effects of Brief Interactions: Evidence from Immigrant Ships

Bauke Visser, Erasmus University Rotterdam
The Value of Proximity to Power: the Case of Editorial Boards of Economics Journals

Giulio Iacobelli, Paris School of Economics
Endogenous Institutions: a network experiment in Nepal

12:30 > 13:30 pm *Lunch*
> Salle de colloque 1 (ground floor)

13:30 > 15:30 pm **Parallel Sessions B**

Communication Networks

Chair: Sebastiano Della Lena - Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

Yann Bramoullé, AMSE
Diffusion Centrality: Foundations and Extensions

Aidan Smith, University of Oxford
Strategic Information Release on a Communication Network

Yves Zenou, Monash University
Does Social Media Increase Polarization?

Sebastiano Della Lena, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia
Non-Bayesian Social Learning and the Spread of Misinformation in Networks

15:30 > 16:00 pm *Coffee break*
> Salle de colloque 1 (ground floor)

16:00 > 17:00 pm **Parallel Sessions C**

Production Networks

Chair: Glenn Magerman - Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

Kenan Huremovic, IMT School for Advanced Studies
Learning Trade Opportunities through Production Network

Glenn Magerman, Université libre de Bruxelles, ECARES
Price Updating with Production Networks

17:00 > 18:00 pm **Keynote Lecture #2**
Asuman Ozdaglar, MIT
TBA

Chair: Frédéric Déroian, AMSE
> Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

18:00 > 19:00 pm CTN board meeting

19:30 pm Dinner « Les Inséparables » - 4 avenue Reine Astrid, 13090 Aix-en-Provence

Coalitions

Chair: Jérôme Dollinger - Room 3.09 (3rd floor)

Michele Lombardi, University of Glasgow
Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

Simon Hoof, Paderborn University
Linear-state differential games in partition function form

Rajiv Vohra, Brown University
Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set

Jérôme Dollinger, Université Catholique de Louvain, CORE, CEREC
R&D and market sharing agreements

Mechanism Design

Chair: Toygar Kerman - Room 3.09 (3rd floor)

Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University
Non-Cooperative Team Formation and a Team Formation Mechanism

Constantine Sorokin, University of Glasgow
Adverse implementation

Anna Bogomolnaia, University of Glasgow
Fair mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences

Toygar Kerman, Maastricht University
Persuading Voters With Private Communication Strategies

International Unions

Chair: Gero Henseler - Room 3.09 (3rd floor)

Larry Karp, University of California, Berkeley
Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements

Gero Henseler, University of Hamburg
Multiple international unions



coalition theory network

24th conference



Friday, May 17th

9:00 > 10:00 am

Keynote Lecture #3

Matthew O. Jackson, Stanford University
The Evolution of Networks and Homophily

Chair: Sebastian Bervoets, AMSE
> Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

10:00 > 10:30 am

Coffee-break

> Salle de colloque 1 (ground floor)

10:30 > 12:30 pm

Parallel Sessions D

Networks and Industrial Organisation

Chair: Jörg Kalbfuss - Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

Alan Walsh, University of Cambridge
Cournot Intermediation Chains

Shaden Shabayek, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics
Pricing in Networks with Anonymized Information

Jörg Kalbfuss, University of Cambridge
Organisation Design and Market Competition

12:30 > 13:30 pm

Lunch

> Salle de colloque 1 (ground floor)

13:30 > 15:00 pm

Parallel Sessions E

Network Games

Chair: Junjie Zhou - Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

Michel Grabisch, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics
Anti-conformism in the threshold model of collective behavior

Paolo Pin, Università Bocconi
Learning and Selfconfirming Equilibria in Network Games

Junjie Zhou, National University of Singapore
Coordination on Networks

15:00 > 15:30 pm

Coffee break

> Salle de colloque 1 (ground floor)

15:30 > 17:00 pm

Parallel Sessions F

Networks

Chair: Xavier Venel - Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

Wei Zhao, HEC Paris
Structural Interventions of Social Ties

Kota Murayama, Northwestern University
Social Value of Information in Networked Economies

Xavier Venel, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics
Sequential competition and the strategic origins of preferential attachment

Network Formation

Chair: Vincent Vannetelbosch - Room 3.09 (3rd floor)

Sudipta Sarangi, DIW Berlin
Network Formation with Multigraphs and Strategic Complementarities

Philippe Bich, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics
On the Existence of Perfect Pairwise Stable Weighted Networks

Marco Pelliccia, Bangor University
Network Structure and Credit Rating

Vincent Vannetelbosch, Université Catholique de Louvain
Network formation with myopic and farsighted players

Networks and Income Redistribution

Chair: Nizar Allouch - Room 3.09 (3rd floor)

Christian Ghigliano, University of Essex
Class Altruism and Redistribution

Anasuya Raj, CREST, École Polytechnique
Optimal income taxation in the presence of networks of altruism

Nizar Allouch, University of Kent
A network approach to welfare

Game Theory

Chair: Nicolas Quérou - Room 3.09 (3rd floor)

Alexander Shapoval, National Research University Higher School of Economics
A Note on Strong Nash Equilibria and Strong Potential Functions

Flip Klijn, Institute for Economic Analysis (IAE-CSIC)
Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core

Nicolas Quérou, Centre d'Économie de l'Environnement - Montpellier
Interacting collective action problems