

coalition theory network 24th conference



Conference venue: Maison de la Recherche, 29, avenue Robert Schuman, 13100 Aix-en-Provence

Thursday, May 16th

8:30 > 9:00 am Welcoming coffee and registration

9:00 > 10:00 am **Keynote Lecture #1**

Adam Szeidl, Central European University

Direct and Indirect Effects of Financial Access on SMEs

Chair: Yann Bramoullé, AMSE > Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

10:00 > 10:30 am

> Salle de collogue 1 (ground floor)

10:30 > 12:30 pm **Parallel Sessions A**

Empirics of Social Interactions

Chair: Giulio Iacobelli - Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

Daniel Chen, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse Ideas Have Consequences: The Impact of Law and Economics on American Justice

Diego Battiston, Stockholm University

The Persistent Effects of Brief Interactions: Evidence from Immigrant Ships

Bauke Visser, Erasmus University Rotterdam

The Value of Proximity to Power: the Case of Editorial Boards of Economics Journals

Giulio lacobelli, Paris School of Economics

Endogenous Institutions: a network experiment in Nepal

12:30 > 13:30 pm Lunch

> Salle de colloque 1 (ground floor)

13:30 > 15:30 pm **Parallel Sessions B**

Communication Networks Chair: Sebastiano Della Lena - *Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)*

Yann Bramoullé, AMSE

Diffusion Centrality: Foundations and Extensions

Aidan Smith, University of Oxford Strategic Information Release on a Communication Network

Yves Zenou, Monash University

Does Social Media Increase Polarization?

Sebastiano Della Lena, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia

Non-Bayesian Social Learning and the Spread of Misinformation in Networks

15:30 > 16:00 pm Coffee break

> Salle de colloque 1 (ground floor)

16:00 > 17:00 pm Parallel Sessions C

Production Networks

Chair: Cédric Duprez - Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

Kenan Huremovic, IMT School for Advanced Studies Learning Trade Opportunities through Production Network

Cédric Duprez, National Bank of Belgium Price Updating with Production Networks

19:30 pm

17:00 > 18:00 pm **Keynote Lecture #2**

Asuman Ozdaglar, MIT

Network Games

Chair: Frédéric Déroïan, AMSE > Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

18:00 > 19:00 pm CTN board meeting

Michele Lombardi, University of Glasgow Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?

Simon Hoof, Paderborn University

Linear-state differential games in partition function form

Rajiv Vohra, Brown University Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set

Jérôme Dollinger, Université Catholique de Louvain, CORE, CEREC

R&D and market sharing agreements

Mechanism Design Chair: Toygar Kerman - *Room 3.09 (3rd floor)*

Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University

Non-Cooperative Team Formation and a Team Formation Mechanism

Constantine Sorokin, University of Glasgow

Adverse implementation

Anna Bogomolnaia, University of Glasgow Fair mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences

Toygar Kerman, Maastricht University

Persuading Voters With Private Communication Strategies

Game Theory 1

Raphael Soubeyran, INRA

Incentives, Pro-Social Preferences and Discrimination

Gero Henseler, University of Hamburg

Multiple international unions

Dinner « Les Inséparables » - 4 avenue Reine Astrid, 13090 Aix-en-Provence



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Friday, May 17th

9:00 > 10:00 am **Keynote Lecture #3**

Matthew O. Jackson, Stanford University The Evolution of Networks and Homophily

Chair: Sebastian Bervoets, AMSE > Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

10:00 > 10:30 am *Coffee-break*

> Salle de colloque 1 (ground floor)

10:30 > 12:30 pm Parallel Sessions D

Networks and Industrial Organisation Chair: Jörg Kalbfuss - Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

Luca Merlino, University of Antwerp
The Private Provision of Public Goods in Endogenous Networks

Alan Walsh, University of Cambridge *Cournot Intermediation Chains*

Shaden Shabayek, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Fconomics

Pricing in Networks with Anonymized Information

Jörg Kalbfuss, University of Cambridge Organisation Design and Market Competition

12:30 > 13:30 pm Lunch

> Salle de colloque 1 (ground floor)

13:30 > 15:00 pm Parallel Sessions E

Network Games

Chair: Junjie Zhou - Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

Michel Grabisch, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics **Anti-conformism in the threshold model of collective behavior**

Paolo Pin, Università Bocconi Learning and Selfconfirming Equilibria in Network Games

Junjie Zhou, National University of Singapore **Coordination on Networks**

> Salle de colloque 1 (ground floor)

15:30 > 17:00 pm Parallel Sessions F

Networks

Chair: Xavier Venel - Salle de colloque 2 (ground floor)

Wei Zhao, HEC Paris Structural Interventions of Social Ties

Kota Murayama, Northwestern University Social Value of Information in Networked Economies

Xavier Venel, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics *Sequential competition and the strategic origins of preferential attachment* **Network Formation**

Chair: Sudipta Sarangi - *Room 3.09 (3rd floor)*

Vincent Vannetelbosch, Université Catholique de Louvain *Network formation with myopic and farsighted players*

Philippe Bich, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics *On the Existence of Perfect Pairwise Stable Weighted Networks*

Marco Pelliccia, Bangor University Network Structure and Credit Rating

Networks and Income Redistribution
Chair: Nizar Allouch - Room 3.09 (3rd floor)

Christian Ghiglino, University of Essex *Class Altruism and Redistribution*

Anasuya Raj, CREST, École Polytechnique Optimal income taxation in the presence of networks of altruism

Nizar Allouch, University of Kent *A network approach to welfare*

Game Theory 2

Chair: Nicolas Ouérou - Room 3.09 (3rd floor)

Alexander Shapoval, National Research University Higher School of Economics A Note on Strong Nash Equilibria and Strong Potential Functions

Flip Klijn, Institute for Economic Analysis (IAE-CSIC) Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core

Nicolas Quérou, Centre d'Économie de l'Environnement - Montpellier *Interacting collective action problems*













