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Sustainable collusion on separate markets

Article
Author/s: 
Paul Belleflamme and Francis Bloch
Economics Letters
Issue number: 
2
Publisher: 
Elsevier
Year: 
2008
Journal pages: 
384–386
Webpage [1]
In a Cournot duopoly where firms incur a fixed cost for serving each market, collusion is easier to sustain with production quotas if the fixed cost is small enough, and with market sharing agreements if it is large enough.

Source URL:http://coalitiontheory.net/content/sustainable-collusion-separate-markets

Links
[1] http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176507003199