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The Evolution of a "Kantian Trait": Inferring from the Dictator Game

Working paper
Author/s: 
Lorenzo Cerda Planas
Issue number: 
2015.32
Series: 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
Year: 
2015
Working Paper [1]
The aim of this paper is twofold. Starting from the population dynamics literature, which usually finds the resulting distribution of a trait in a population, according to some parents' preferences, I answer the inverted question: Which preference function would yield into a given trait distribution? I solve this using a continuous trait, instead of finite types of agents. Using this result, I connect this transmission theory of social traits with the well-known results of Dictator Game (DG) experiments. I use a specific definition of a Kantian trait applied to DG results, and determine the distribution of this trait that is commonly found in these experiments. With these two ingredients, I show that homo-oeconomicus parents have a greater' dislike' or disutility of having offspring with different traits from them compared to their Kantian counterparts. This could be a result of myopic empathy being stronger in homo-oeconomicus parents, driving this dislike of difference.
Tags: 
Experiments [2]
Game Theory & Graphs [3]

Source URL:http://coalitiontheory.net/content/evolution-kantian-trait-inferring-dictator-game

Links
[1] ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2015/15032.pdf [2] http://coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/experiments [3] http://coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/game-theory-graphs