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Home > Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies

Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies

Working paper
Author/s: 
Yann Rébillé, Lionel Richefort
Issue number: 
2015.057
Series: 
FEEM Note di Lavoro
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Year: 
2015
Working Paper [1]
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.
Tags: 
Network Games [2]
Political Economy [3]
Social Choice [4]

Source URL:http://coalitiontheory.net/content/networks-many-public-goods-non-linear-best-replies

Links
[1] http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/2015616154374NDL2015-057.pdf [2] http://coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/network-games [3] http://coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/political-economy [4] http://coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/social-choice