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Home > A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes

A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes

Working paper
Author/s: 
Ulrich Faigle, Michel Grabisch
Issue number: 
2013.52
Publisher: 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne
Year: 
2013
PDF [1]
The Shapley value is defined as the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition N when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general model of coalition formation where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need not finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which is weaker than the one in the original paper but allows a much more transparent correctness proof. Moreover, the logical independence of the axioms is proved.
Tags: 
Coalition Formation Theory [2]

Source URL:http://coalitiontheory.net/content/concise-axiomatization-shapley-type-value-stochastic-coalition-processes

Links
[1] ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2013/13052.pdf [2] http://coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/coalition-formation-theory