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Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts

Working paper
Author/s: 
Claus-Jochen Haake and Bettina Klaus
Publisher: 
Maastricht University
Year: 
2008
PDF [1]
We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hat eld and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) mono- tonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable. Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto e cient, individually rational, and monotonic is a superso- lution of the stable correspondence. In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto e cient, individually rational, and implementable.
Tags: 
Matching [2]

Source URL:http://coalitiontheory.net/content/monotonicity-and-nash-implementation-matching-markets-contracts

Links
[1] http://edocs.ub.unimaas.nl/loader/file.asp?id=1082 [2] http://coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/matching