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Influence functions, followers and command games

Working paper
Author/s: 
Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska
Issue number: 
2008.80
Publisher: 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne
Year: 
2008
PDF [1]
We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation between two central concepts of this model: influence function, and follower function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a follower function, and we describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that lead to a given follower function. In the command structure introduced by Hu and Shapley, for each player a simple game called the command game is built. One of the central concepts of this model is the concept of command function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a command function, and describe the minimal sets generating a normal command game. We also study the relation between command games and influence functions. A sufficient and necessary condition for the equivalence between an influence function and a normal command game is delivered.
Tags: 
Social Choice [2]

Source URL:http://coalitiontheory.net/content/influence-functions-followers-and-command-games

Links
[1] ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2008/B08080.pdf [2] http://coalitiontheory.net/research-areas/social-choice