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Influence functions, followers and command games

Article
Author/s: 
Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska
Games and Economic Behavior
Issue number: 
1
Publisher: 
Elsevier
Year: 
2011
Journal pages: 
123–138
Webpage [1]
We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation between two central concepts of this model: influence function, and follower function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a follower function, and we describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that lead to a given follower function. In the command structure introduced by Hu and Shapley, for each player a simple game called the command game is built. One of the central concepts of this model is the concept of command function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a command function, and describe the minimal sets generating a normal command game. We also study the relation between command games and influence functions. A sufficient and necessary condition for the equivalence between an influence function and a normal command game is delivered.

Source URL:http://coalitiontheory.net/content/influence-functions-followers-and-command-games-0

Links
[1] http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825610001028