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Transferable utility games with uncertainty

Article
Author/s: 
Jean-Jacques Herings and H. Habis
Journal of Economic Theory
Issue number: 
5
Publisher: 
Elsevier
Year: 
2011
Journal pages: 
2126–2139
Webpage [1]
We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex.

Source URL:http://coalitiontheory.net/content/transferable-utility-games-uncertainty

Links
[1] http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053111000895