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All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof

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Working paper
Author/s: 
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme
Issue number: 
1108 | July 2019
Series: 
Barcelona GSE Working Papers
Publisher: 
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
Year: 
2019
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. Although obvious strategy-proofness is in general more restrictive than strategy-proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
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