Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis

Printer-friendly version
Article
Author/s: 
Giacomo Bonanno, Elias Tsakas
Games and Economic Behavior
Publisher: 
Elsevier
Year: 
2018
We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Börgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS.
Developed by Paolo Gittoi