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Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalition Deviations

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Working paper
Author/s: 
Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta
Issue number: 
763
Publisher: 
University of Warwick
Year: 
2006
This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.
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