Dividing bads under additive utilities

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Article
Author/s: 
Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Elena Yanovskaia
Social Choice and Welfare
Publisher: 
Springer
Year: 
2018
We compare the Egalitarian rule (aka Egalitarian Equivalent) and the Competitive rule (aka Comeptitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) to divide bads (chores). They are both welfarist: the competitive disutility profile(s) are the critical points of their Nash product on the set of efficient feasible profiles. The C rule is Envy Free, Maskin Monotonic, and has better incentives properties than the E rule. But, unlike the E rule, it can be wildly multivalued, admits no selection continuous in the utility and endowment parameters, and is harder to compute. Thus in the division of bads, unlike that of goods, no rule normatively dominates the other.
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