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Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: an axiomatic characterization

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Working paper
Bezalel Peleg, Hans J.M. Peters
Issue number: 
GSBE Research Memoranda
Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics
Feasible elimination procedures Peleg, 1978 play a central role in constructing social choice functions which have the following property in the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondence resulting from applying feasible elimination procedures. The axioms are anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking.
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