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Feasible elimination procedures in social choice: An axiomatic characterization

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Article
Author/s: 
Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
Research in Economics
Issue number: 
Volume 71, Issue 1, March 2017
Publisher: 
Elsevier
Year: 
2017
Journal pages: 
43-50
Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in constructing social choice functions which have the following property: in the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondences resulting from applying feasible elimination procedures. The axioms are anonymity, Maskin monotonicity, and independent blocking. We also show that these axioms are logically independent.
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