Ingratiation and Favoritism in Organizations
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Working paper
Issue number:
2016.10
Series:
CES Working Papers
Publisher:
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne
Year:
2016
We combine in the same theoretical framework two related phenomena that can be
present in organizations – ingratiation of subordinates and favoritism of superiors towards some of
their employees. There are three actors in the model: a worker, a manager supervising the worker,
and a firm that employs the worker and the manager. Ingratiation is defined as a strategic behavior
of the worker to make himself more attractive to the manager. In our model ingratiation is expressed
by opinion conformity which is exerted by the worker when reporting his opinion to the manager.
Favoritism of the manager is based on using a bias when reporting to the firm her observation of the
worker’s performance. First, we determine the optimal level of the effort and the reported opinion
of the worker, and the level of bias of the manager. Then, we investigate the effects of favoritism
and ingratiation on the expected wages and utilities of the worker and the manager, and on the
expected profit of the firm.