Issue No. 14/2010

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CTN Newsletter n.14 > September 2010

>> Job announcements

>> Forthcoming events

>> Latest working papers

by Guillaume Haeringer, CODE - Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona

The next CTN workshop will be held in Barcelona, on February 4-5, 2011. Since its creation the CTN workshop has witnessed the rapid growth of coalition and network theory, as well as the development of matching theory. In the recent years these fields have gained maturity and proved being capable to tackle deeper issues in Economics ... >> more

CTN Announcements


16th Coalition Theory Network Workshop 

Barcelona, Spain , 4-5 February, 2011

The Center for the study of the Organizations and Decisions in Economics (CODE) of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and Markets, Organizations and Votes in Economics (MOVE) will be organizing the 16th Coalition Theory Network Workshop in Barcelona, Spain, on February 4-5, 2011.

More information soon! 

MINT SEMINAR - “Models of Influence and Network Theory” 
Paris, France, 15 October 2010

The seminar is sponsored by the ANR (National Agency for Research) and is a scientific meeting of the project MINT - Models of Influence and Network Theory... >> more

PET 2011 
Bloomington, Indiana, USA, June 2-4, 2011
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The Association for Public Economic Theory (APET) is pleased to announce that it will hold its twelfth international meeting at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. As with previous PET conferences, papers in all aspects of public economics and related areas will be presented... >> more

Article: Consensus requirements and efficiency in a bargaining game with positive externalities
by Daniel Cardona and Antoni Rubí-Barceló, Universitat de les Illes Balears


Our work focuses on the analysis of environments where collective disputes involve a fixed divisible surplus to share and where agents may have interrelated goals. In particular, we analyze a multilateral "pure sharing" bargaining problem with positive consumption externalities that depend negatively on the
distance between agents, with the particularity that a set of n peripheral agents are equidistantly located with respect to a unique central player. Our main goal is to compare the outcomes that result in this bargaining game under alternative (i) consensus requirements and (ii) specifications of the dependence
of externalities on the distance. In particular, we analyze how efficiency and players' expected utilities are affected by these two aspects... >> more 

Article: Endogenous network formation in patent contests and its role as a barrier to entry
by Marco Marinucci (CORE, UCL) and Wouter Vergote (CEREC, FUSL and CORE, UCL)


It is widely recognized that firms often engage in R&D contests in order to be the first, and often the only, to develop a new product/technology. In such an environment firms generally have the opportunity to develop some degree of collaboration. Historically, the literature modeling R&D competition has focused mainly on pure R&D competition (patent race, contest etc.) and on full R&D cooperation (R&D Partnerships, Research Joint Ventures). That is, situations in which firms are either friends or foes.
Recently, more attention has been devoted to instances in which firms are both friends and foes: intermediate forms of collaboration in which firms cooperate to strengthen their joint position in R&D contests, without sharing the benefits of winning the contest... >> more

Report: 15th Coalition Theory Network Workshop
Marseilles, France, June 17-18, 2010
by Frédéric Deroïan, Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM) - Université de Marseille


The event was a two-day workshop with both plenary and parallel sessions. There were 43 presentations, including three guests and seven slots dedicated to CTN members. The event was organized in June in order to attract trans-Atlantic colleagues. Indeed, the guests came from Berkeley, MIT and Brown. There were also two presentations from Montréal, one from Laval (Québec), one from Stanford, one from U. of Oregon. There was also one presentation from Hitotsubashi U, Tokyo... >> more 

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Next issue: March 2011

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