Issue No. 16/2011
CTN Newsletter n.16 > September 2011
>>Network & coalition theory
on the web
Editorial
by Agnieszka Rusinowska, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, CNRS – Université Paris 1The next CTN workshop (CTN17) will be held in Paris, on February 3-4, 2012. CTN17 will be aimed at providing an avenue for presenting and discussing new contributions on network, coalition and matching theory, with particular focus on financial networks. This theme, being closely related to current economic problems, and consequently containing topics of importance, has not been emphasized in the previous CTN workshops. The guest speakers will be Franklin ALLEN (University of Pennsylvania), Rajiv VOHRA (Brown University), and Yves ZENOU (Stockholm University). >> more
CTN Announcements
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17th Coalition Theory Network Workshop
Paris, France, 3-4 February, 2012
The Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne will be organizing the 17th Coalition Theory Network Workshop in Paris, France, on 3-4 February 2012. The guest speakers will be:
- Franklin ALLEN (University of Pennsylvania, http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~allenf/)
- Rajiv VOHRA (Brown University, http://www.econ.brown.edu/~rvohra/)
- Yves ZENOU (Stockholm University,http://people.su.se/~yvze0888/).
Workshop: Cooperation, Matching and Collective Goods
San Luis, 24-25 November 2011
http://www.workshop2011.unsl.edu.ar/
The Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (IMASL) of Universidad Nacional de San Luis and Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONICET), in conjunction with the Association for Public Economic Theory (APET), will be organizing the Workshop "Cooperation, Matching and Collective Goods"... >> more
Article: Majority rules and stability in games with spillovers
by Sergio Currarini, FEEM and University of Venice
and Marco Marini, University of Urbino "Carlo Bo"
Most social situations are such that agents' actions affect the welfare of some or all other agents in the system. This is the case, for instance, of public goods production, global pollution control, imperfectly competitive markets, auctions, and so on. In these cases, what agents or coalitions of agents expect to attain in absence of global cooperation depends on how the remaining agents are expected to behave in such occurrency. If one defines a stable social outcome as a globally agreed norm of behaviour that no agent or coalition would improve upon by its sole forces, the analysis of stability crucially hinges upon the expected behaviour in case of disagreement.... >> more
Scientific report of the SING VII Congress
Paris, France, 18-20 July 2011
by Agnieszka Rusinowska, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, CNRS – Université Paris 1
The Seventh Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING7) took place at TELECOM ParisTech from July 18th to 20th, 2011. The conference was jointly organized by University of Paris I, Paris School of Economics, and TELECOM ParisTech. The local organizing committee (chaired by Michel Grabisch) was formed in majority by members of Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne. SING7 was the seventh in the series of Spain-Italy-Netherlands Meetings on Game Theory, and the first one organized in France. As suggested by the name of this series of conferences, the general aim of the SING meetings is to provide an avenue for presenting and discussing new results in Game Theory.... >> more
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Next issue: March 2012
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