Issue No. 23 Spring 2015

Printer-friendly version
Newsletter
Year: 
2015

News

 

Questo testo viene mostrato quando l'immagine è bloccata

A new partner joins the Coalition Theory Network
The Adam Smith Business School at the University of Glasgow has officially joined the Network last March. The CTN Scientific Board welcomes the new member Prof. Anna Bogomolnaia.
Read more ›

 

Events

 

Questo testo viene mostrato quando l'immagine è bloccata

Fifth Annual Search and Matching Conference
The Search and Matching Network (SaM) is a European network of academic economists working on search and matching models, including models of labour market search, consumer search, money search and housing search.
Read more ›

 

Questo testo viene mostrato quando l'immagine è bloccata

8th Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Symposium
The broad topic of the Symposium is Theory and Experiments and centers around the question if and how economic experiments can inform economic theory and vice versa.
Read more ›

 

Publications

 

 

Questo testo viene mostrato quando l'immagine è bloccata

Strategic interaction in online advertisement
Sergei Izmalkov
One of the most common online activities is search. Notably, search platforms are market makers: they create their own rules and procedures of how advertisers are matched to customers. How to do this matching effectively is the main objective for practitioners and a fascinating problem for economic theorists.
Read more ›

 

Article
Beliefs and truth-telling: A laboratory experiment 
Ronald Peeters, Marc Vorsatz, Markus Walzl
We conduct a laboratory experiment with a constant-sum sender–receiver game and a sequential game of matching pennies with the same payoff structure to investigate the impact of individuals’ first- and second-order beliefs on truth-telling.
Read more ›

Article
Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo and Licun Xue
We consider issue-externality games in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues, that is, the amount a coalition receives in one issue depends on how the players are organized on all the issues.
Read more ›

Article
Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin
When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assigned is an important design concern. We compute the guaranteed size ratio of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, i.e., the worst ratio of the actual expected size to the maximal feasible size.
Read more ›

Article
Luring Others into Climate Action: Coalition Formation Games with Threshold and Spillover Effects
Valentina Bosetti, Melanie Heugues, Alessandro Tavoni
We study the effect of leadership in an experimental threshold public ‘bad’ game, where we manipulate both the relative returns of two investments (the more productive of which causes a negative externality) and the extent to which the gains from leadership diffuse to the group.
Read more ›

Developed by Paolo Gittoi