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Issue No. 25 Spring 2016

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Newsletter
Year: 
2016

News & Events

 
 
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21st CTN Workshop, Moscow
Registrations are now open for the annual CTN Workshop, that will be held in Moscow, Russia, on 19-20 May 2016. The number of available places is limited. They will be assigned on a first come first served basis.
Register now >

 

 

 
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Strategic Interactions, Information Transmission and Externalities in Networks
The Workshop is organised by Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne and will be held in Paris next 24-25 May 2016.
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4th European Meeting on Networks
The Meeting is a forum for the presentation of frontier research on Networks and will be held in Aix-en-Provence on 2-3 June 2016.
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9th Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Symposium
The broad topic of the Symposium, scheduled for next 6-7 June, centers around the question if and how economic experiments can inform economic theory and vice versa.
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Recent Developments in Behavioural Economics and Mechanism Design
The workshop, to be held in Glasgow on 24-25 June 2016, will share information and raise awareness of the rapidly growing literature on behavioral mechanism design.
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Selected Publications

 
 
 
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How to Enforce Environmental Taxes – Game Theoretical Approaches
A. Marcel Oestreich
An essential component in the design of environmental tax systems is the ability to enforce compliance. Traditional theory suggests that firms comply with environmental taxes when the tax is less than the expected fine... Read more ›

 

 

Working Paper
Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants
Alessandra Casella, Jean-François Laslier, Antonin Macé
In a polarized committee, majority voting disenfranchises the minority. By allowing voters to spend freely a fixed budget of votes over multiple issues, Storable Votes restores some minority power. We study a model of Storable Votes that highlights the hide-and-seek nature of the strategic game. 
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Article
Efficient Sorting in Frictional Labor Markets with two-sided Heterogeneity
Luca Paolo Merlino
This paper studies how search externalities and wage bargaining distort vacancy creation and the allocation of workers to jobs in markets with two-sided heterogeneity. To do so, I propose a model of a frictional labor market where heterogeneous workers decide which job to look for and firms decide which technology to adopt.
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Article
Heuristic Decision Making in Network Linking
Marjolein J.W. Harmsen-van Hout, Benedict G.C. Dellaert, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Network formation among individuals constitutes an important part of many OR processes, but relatively little is known about how individuals make their linking decisions in networks. This article provides an investigation of heuristic effects in individual linking decisions for network formation in an incentivized lab-experimental setting.
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Working Paper
EU ETS Facets in the Net: How Account Types Influence the Structure of the System
Simone Borghesi, Andrea Flori
In this work, we investigate which countries have been more central during Phases I and II of the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) with respect to the different types of accounts operating in the system. 
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Article
Entropy, desegregation, and proportional rationing
Hervé Moulin
An assignment of students to schools displays zero-segregation if all schools have the same distribution of the different types of students (ethnic, geographical, gender). We axiomatize the choice of an optimally desegregated assignment under arbitrary capacity constraints.
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