Issue No. 32 - Autumn 2019

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News & Events

CTN 2020

25th CTN Workshop - Save the Dates

Next CTN Annual Workshop will be held in Barcelona, Spain  next 21-22 May 2020, organised by the CTN team at MOVE.
Stay tuned for updates


Social Diversity, Development and Stability: The Role of Context

Moscow, Russia, 4-5 October 2019
The conference, organised by NES CSDSI and CRED How and under what circumstances social diversity becomes a problem for development and stability, and how the underlying dynamic works?  Read more >


14th Workshop on Economic Design and Institutions
Bruxelles, Belgium, 6 December 2019
The Belgian Coalition Theory Network team proposes its annual meeting, which will be held at Université Saint Louis, Bruxelles  
Read more >


CTN Job market candidates
The CTN promotes the exchange of PhD candidates for mock interview days and seminars across member institutions so as to improve the their preparation for the job market.  
See this year's candidates >

3rd AERNA Workshop on Game Theory and the Environment

Valencia, Spain, 3-4 September 2019

Alessandro Tavoni (CMCC) presented the paper "Delegation in a Public Goods Game" 
> Event info


2° Padua Meeting on Economic Design and Institutions
Padua, Italy, 27-28 September 2019

Salvador Barberà (MOVE) will give the keynote speach "Daunou’s voting method"   
> Event info


5th Lancaster Game Theory Conference

Lancaster, UK, 1-2 November 2019

Herve Moulin (Glasgowwill give a keynote speach at the event 
> Event info

The Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications #11
Lisbon, Portugal, 7-8 November June 2019
Vincent Vannetelbosch and Ana Mauleon (CORE) will present two papers, respectively: “Who Matters In Coordination Problems On Networks: Myopic Or Farsighted Agents?” and “A Bargaining Set for Roommate Problems”
> Event info

Selected Publications




From Theory to Application

Time Banks: A Mechanism Design Approach

Flip Klijn

In a large number of real-life markets agents exchange goods or services without recurring to money. An important instance is time banks. Read more ›


Price Disclosure by Two-sided Platforms

Paul Belleflamme, Martin Peitz

We consider two-sided platforms with the feature that some users on one or both sides of the market lack information about the price charged to participants on the other side of the market. With positive cross-group external effects, such lack of price information makes demand less elastic.

Read more ›


Dynamic competition over social networks

Antoine Mandel, Xavier Venel

We propose an analytical approach to the problem of influence maximization in a social network where two players compete by means of dynamic targeting strategies. We formulate the problem as a two-player zero-sum stochastic game.

Read more ›


Climate clubs and the macro-economic benefits of international cooperation on climate policy

Leonidas Paroussos, Antoine Mandel, Kostas Fragkiadakis, Panagiotis

The Paris agreement has provided a new framework for climate policy. Complementary forms of international collaboration, such as climate clubs, are probably necessary to foster and mainstream the process of gradual and voluntary increase in nation-ally determined contributions. We provide a quantitative macro-economic assessment of the costs and benefits that would be associated with different climate club architectures.

Read more ›


Mapping the landscape of climate services
Francesca Larosa and Jaroslav Mysiak

Research has explored the advancements of climate services in multiple fields, producing a wealth of interdisciplinary knowledge spanning from climatology to social sciences. The aim of this paper is to map the global landscape of research on climate services and to identify patterns at individual, affiliation and country level and the structural properties of each community.

Read more ›

Working Paper

All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme

For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof. 

Read more ›

Developed by Paolo Gittoi