Issue No. 32 - Autumn 2019
News & Events
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25th CTN Workshop - Save the Dates
Next CTN Annual Workshop will be held in Barcelona, Spain next 21-22 May 2020, organised by the CTN team at MOVE.
Stay tuned for updates
Social Diversity, Development and Stability: The Role of Context
Moscow, Russia, 4-5 October 2019
The conference, organised by NES CSDSI and CRED How and under what circumstances social diversity becomes a problem for development and stability, and how the underlying dynamic works? Read more >
14th Workshop on Economic Design and Institutions
Bruxelles, Belgium, 6 December 2019
The Belgian Coalition Theory Network team proposes its annual meeting, which will be held at Université Saint Louis, Bruxelles
Read more >
CTN Job market candidates
The CTN promotes the exchange of PhD candidates for mock interview days and seminars across member institutions so as to improve the their preparation for the job market.
See this year's candidates >
3rd AERNA Workshop on Game Theory and the Environment
Valencia, Spain, 3-4 September 2019
Alessandro Tavoni (CMCC) presented the paper "Delegation in a Public Goods Game"
> Event info
2° Padua Meeting on Economic Design and Institutions
Padua, Italy, 27-28 September 2019
Salvador Barberà (MOVE) will give the keynote speach "Daunou’s voting method"
> Event info
5th Lancaster Game Theory Conference
Lancaster, UK, 1-2 November 2019
Herve Moulin (Glasgow) will give a keynote speach at the event
> Event info
The Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and Applications #11
Lisbon, Portugal, 7-8 November June 2019
Vincent Vannetelbosch and Ana Mauleon (CORE) will present two papers, respectively: “Who Matters In Coordination Problems On Networks: Myopic Or Farsighted Agents?” and “A Bargaining Set for Roommate Problems”
> Event info
Selected Publications
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From Theory to Application
Time Banks: A Mechanism Design Approach
Flip Klijn
In a large number of real-life markets agents exchange goods or services without recurring to money. An important instance is time banks. Read more ›
Article
Price Disclosure by Two-sided Platforms
Paul Belleflamme, Martin Peitz
We consider two-sided platforms with the feature that some users on one or both sides of the market lack information about the price charged to participants on the other side of the market. With positive cross-group external effects, such lack of price information makes demand less elastic.
Article
Dynamic competition over social networks
Antoine Mandel, Xavier Venel
We propose an analytical approach to the problem of influence maximization in a social network where two players compete by means of dynamic targeting strategies. We formulate the problem as a two-player zero-sum stochastic game.
Article
Climate clubs and the macro-economic benefits of international cooperation on climate policy
Leonidas Paroussos, Antoine Mandel, Kostas Fragkiadakis, Panagiotis
The Paris agreement has provided a new framework for climate policy. Complementary forms of international collaboration, such as climate clubs, are probably necessary to foster and mainstream the process of gradual and voluntary increase in nation-ally determined contributions. We provide a quantitative macro-economic assessment of the costs and benefits that would be associated with different climate club architectures.
Article
Mapping the landscape of climate services
Francesca Larosa and Jaroslav Mysiak
Research has explored the advancements of climate services in multiple fields, producing a wealth of interdisciplinary knowledge spanning from climatology to social sciences. The aim of this paper is to map the global landscape of research on climate services and to identify patterns at individual, affiliation and country level and the structural properties of each community.
Working Paper
All Sequential Allotment Rules Are Obviously Strategy-Proof
R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme
For the division problem with single-peaked preferences (Sprumont, 1991) we show that all sequential allotment rules, identified by Barberà, Jackson and Neme (1997) as the class of strategy-proof, efficient and replacement monotonic rules, are also obviously strategy-proof.