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On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences

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Working paper
Author/s: 
Murat Öztürk , Hans Peters and Ton Storcken
Issue number: 
RM/12/040
Publisher: 
Maastricht University
Year: 
2012
In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. A single-best point is a point which is the unique point at maximal distance from some other point of the polytope. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is a dictatorship unless the polytope has exactly two single- best points or it has exactly four single-best points which form the vertices of a rectangle. In the latter cases strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules can be obtained by committee voting (simple games) between the single- best alternatives. This framework models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region.
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