In Milan a series of Permanent Itinerant Game Theory Seminars
CISEPS (Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psicology and Social Sciences) is an interdisciplinary research centre at the University of Milan Bicocca, whose aim is to contribute to the advancement of social sciences through interdisciplinary research focused on the improvement of the explanatory and predictive capabilities of the basic models in economics, psychology, sociology and social sciences in general. Its members are scholars working in all fields that can contribute to the achievement of the above goals.
The informal periodical seminars will be as informal as possible, so that speakers might present readings that might stimulate interests, open projects, open problems, work in progress and even working papers. However, all the presentations should be adapted to a
multidisciplinary audience.
The seminars are scheduled on Tuesday and they will be itinerant between Bicocca, Politecnico, and possibly in the future they might involve other Milan universities as well.
The next seminar will be:
1. November 7th, 2017, at 11.00 Seminar Room of the Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milan-Bicocca, Piazza Ateneo Nuovo 1, Building U7, second floor, room 2104
Rui Miguel Constantino Da Silva “Equilibrium selection in games with complete information”
2. November 14th, 2017, at 12.30 Conference Room of the Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering Polytechnic University of Milan via Golgi 34/5, Milan
Francesco Trovò “Online learning techniques for optimization of internet advertising campaigns”
3. December 12th, 2017, at 11.00 Seminar Room of the Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milan-Bicocca, Piazza Ateneo Nuovo 1, Building U7, second floor, room 2104
Andrea Celli “Bayesian Persuasion”
4. January 23rd, 2018 at 12.30 Conference Room of the Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering Polytechnic University of Milan via Golgi 34/5, Milan
Alberto Marchesi, “When are equilibria of simple auctions near-optimal?”
More information: mario.gilli@unimib.it