# Multicoalitional solutions

Working paper

Issue number:

2013.62

Publisher:

Maison des Sciences Économiques

Year:

2013

The paper proposes a new concept of solution for TU games, called multicoalitional solution, which makes sense in the context of production games, that is, where v(S) is the production or income per unit of time. By contrast to classical solutions where elements of the solution are payoﬀ vectors, multicoalitional solutions give in addition an allocation time to each coalition, which permits to realize the payoﬀ vector. We give two instances of such solutions, called the d-multicoalitional core and the c-multicoalitional core, and both arise as the strong Nash equilibrium of two games, where in the ﬁrst utility per active unit of time is maximized, while in the second it is the utility per total unit of time. We show that the d-core (or aspiration core) of Benett, and the c-core of Guesnerie and Oddou are strongly related to the d-multicoalitional and c-multicoalitional cores, respectively, and that the latter ones can be seen as an implementation of the former ones in a non-cooperative framework.