# Network games under strategic complementarities

Article
Author/s:
Mohamed Belhaj, Yann Bramoullé, Frédéric Deroïan
Games and Economic Behavior
Issue number:
Volume 88, November 2014
Year:
2014
Journal pages:
310-319
We study network games under strategic complementarities. Agents are embedded in a fixed network. They choose a positive, continuous action and interact with their network neighbors. Interactions are positive and actions are bounded from above. We first derive new sufficient conditions for uniqueness, covering all concave as well as some non-concave best responses. We then study the relationship between position and action and identify situations where a more central agent always plays a higher action in equilibrium. We finally analyze comparative statics. We show that a shock may not propagate throughout the entire network and uncover a general pattern of decreasing interdependence.
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