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The Nucleolus as a Consistent Power Index in Noncooperative Majority Games

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Working paper
Author/s: 
Maria Montero
Publisher: 
FEEM
Year: 
2001
This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in proper simple games. A power index is called consistent if it can be obtained as equilibrium of the game with random proposers using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses the balancedness result in Kohlberg (1971) reinterpreting the balancing weight as mixed strategies.
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