One-dimensional Bargaining with Markov Recognition Probabilities

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Working paper
Arkadi Predtetchinski
Issue number: 
Maastricht University
We study a process of bargaining over social outcomes represented by points in the unit interval. The identity of the proposer is determined by a general Markov pro- cess and the acceptance of a proposal requires the approval of it by all the players. We show that for every value of the discount factor below one the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies is essentially unique and equal to what we call the bargaining equilibrium. We provide a general characterization of the bargaining equilibrium. We consider next the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium proposals when the discount factor approaches one. We give a complete characterization of the limit of the equilibrium proposals. We show that the limit equilibrium proposals of all the players are the same if the proposer selection process satisfies an irreducibil- ity condition, or more generally, has a unique absorbing set. In general, the limit equilibrium proposals depend on the partition of the set of players in absorbing sets and transient states of the proposer selection process. We fully characterize the limit equilibrium proposals as the unique generalized fixed point of a particular function. This function depends in a simple way on the stationary distribution related to the proposer selection process. We compare the proposal selected according to our bar- gaining model to the one corresponding to the median voter theorem.
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