The Role of Individual Intertemporal Transfers in Dynamic TU-Games

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Working paper
Caroline Berden
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Maastricht University
Dynamic TU-games are considered which consist of a finite player set, a finite se- quence of TU-games and a profile of intertemporal utility functions. At every stage a (restrictively) additive solution is applied to the TU-game, which results in a stream of payoff distributions, evaluated by the intertemporal utility functions of the play- ers. Players are able to transfer payoffs between stages. The strategic possibilities from individual transfers between periods are modeled by a noncooperative game. Conditions under which a Nash equilibrium in this noncooperative game exists, are established. It is shown when a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies is Pareto optimal.
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