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Social insurance with indirect democracy
Working paper
Author/s:
Stéphane Rossignol, Emmanuelle Tagourdoueau
Publisher:
EUREQua
Year:
2003
PDF
In an indirect democracy model we determine the preferred social insurance system. We show that it corresponds to that which implies the lowest contribution rate.
Tags:
Social Choice
Developed by
Paolo Gittoi