# Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts

Working paper

Issue number:

RM/06/041

Publisher:

Maastricht University

Year:

2006

We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict which networks may be formed among farsighted players. A set of networks G is pair- wise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise deviations from any network g ∈ G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse oﬀ or equally well oﬀ, (ii) if there exists a farsightedly improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying
(i) and (ii). We show that a non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto dominating network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest consistent set.