Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

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Article
Author/s: 
Foivos Savva
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number: 
Volume 78, October 2018
Publisher: 
Elsevier
Year: 
2018
Journal pages: 
27-34
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for a social choice rule to be implementable in strong Nash equilibrium in the presence of partially honest agents, that is, agents who break ties in favourof a truthful message when they face indifference between outcomes. In this way, we achieve a relaxation in the condition of Korpela (2013), namely the Axiom of Sufficient Reason. Our new condition, Weak Pareto Dominance, is shown to be sufficient along with Weak Pareto Optimality and Universally Worst Alternative. We finally provide applications of our result in pure matching and bargaining environments.
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