Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit
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Article
Mathematics of Operations Research
Issue number:
Volume 41, Issue 4
Publisher:
Informs
Year:
2016
Journal pages:
1208 - 1221
We prove the existence of a pure subgame–perfect epsilon–equilibrium, for every epsilon > 0, in multiplayer perfect information games, provided that the payoff functions are bounded and exhibit common preferences at the limit. If, in addition, the payoff functions have finite range, then there exists a pure subgame–perfect 0–equilibrium. These results extend and unify recent existence theorems for bounded and semicontinuous payoffs.