Single-peaked choice
![Printer-friendly version Printer-friendly version](http://coalitiontheory.net/sites/all/modules/print/icons/print_icon.png)
Working paper
Issue number:
RM/06/037
Publisher:
Maastricht University
Year:
2006
Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since they were used by Black (1948) to formulate a domain restriction that is suļ¬cient for the exclusion of cycles according to the majority rule. In this paper, we approach single-peakedness from a choice-theoretic perspective. We show that the well-known axiom independence of irrelevant alternatives (a form of contraction consistency) and a weak continuity requirement characterize a class of single-peaked choice functions. Moreover, we examine the rationalizability and the rationalizability-representability of these choice functions.