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Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies

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Working paper
Author/s: 
Yann Rébillé, Lionel Richefort
Issue number: 
2015.057
Series: 
FEEM Note di Lavoro
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Year: 
2015
We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.
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