Working papers

This section showcases the working papers published by Partner institutions in the area of network and coalition formation, and its applications.

In addition, since the formation of the Coalition Theory Network in 1995, all researchers who present their work at the CTN Annual Workshops are invited to publish their papers in the FEEM-CTN Working Papers series. FEEM Working Papers are widely circulated internationally and are downloadable from the FEEM website. They are also present on the AgEcon, Berkeley University Press, RePEc, EconLit, ZBW and SSRN databases.

Papers for publication in the FEEM-CTN Working Paper series can also be submitted by filling out the WEB SUBMISSION FORM on the FEEM website

2012

Environmental maintenance in a dynamic model with heterogenous agents
Kirill Borissov, Thierry Brechet and Stéphane Lambrecht
Tags: Environment
Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
Tags: Environment
Domestic Politics and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements
Simon Dietz, Carmen Marchiori and Alessandro Tavoni
Tags: Environment
Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games
Dominik Karos
Tags: Coalition Formation Theory
Wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time under exogenous strike decisions
Ahmet Ozkardas, Agnieszka Rusinowska
Tags: Bargaining Theory
A Folk Theorem for Bargaining Games
Herings, P.J.J., Meshalkin, A. and Predtetchinski, A.
Intermediation in Networks
Jan-Peter Siedlarek
Tags: Bargaining Theory

2011

A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness for Single-Peaked Preferences
John A. Weymark
Tags: Social Choice
The Interpretation of the Laakso-Taagepera Effective Number of Parties
Jean-François Caulier
Tags: Social Choice
Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders : An Axiomatization
René van den Brink, Agnieszka Rusinowska, Frank Steffen
Tags: Social Choice
False Consensus in Economic Agents
Eugenio Proto and Daniel Sgroi
Tags: Social Choice
A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness for Single-Peaked Preferences
John A. Weymark
Tags: Social Choice
Pampered Bureaucracy, Political Stability, and Trade Integration
Caleb Stroup and Benjamin Zissimos
Tags: Social Choice
Social Conflict and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
Ben Zissimos
Tags: Social Choice
A model of influence based on aggregation functions
Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska
Tags: Social Choice
Behavioral fair social choice
Marc Fleurbaey and Erik Schokkaert
Tags: Social Choice
Evolution of behavior when duopolists choose prices and quantities
Abhimanyu Khan and Ronald Peeters
Tags: Industrial Organisation
Oligopolistic competition with general complementarities
Filippo L. Calciano
Tags: Industrial Organisation
The Effect of Spillovers and Congestion on the Segregative Properties of Endogenous Jurisdiction Structure Formation
Rémy Oddou
Tags: Political Economy
Procedurally Fair Taxation
Jean-Jacques P. Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski
Tags: Political Economy

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