Working papers

This section showcases the working papers published by Partner institutions in the area of network and coalition formation, and its applications.

In addition, since the formation of the Coalition Theory Network in 1995, all researchers who present their work at the CTN Annual Workshops are invited to publish their papers in the FEEM-CTN Working Papers series. FEEM Working Papers are widely circulated internationally and are downloadable from the FEEM website. They are also present on the AgEcon, Berkeley University Press, RePEc, EconLit, ZBW and SSRN databases.

Papers for publication in the FEEM-CTN Working Paper series can also be submitted by filling out the WEB SUBMISSION FORM on the FEEM website

2013

Two Folk Manipulability Theorems in the General One-to-one Two-sided Matching Markets with Money David Pérez-Castrillo and Marilda Sotomayor Tags: Matching	Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets Peter Coles and Ran Shorrer Tags: Matching
The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski, H. and Peyton Young Tags: Matching	Assigning agents to a line Jens L. Hougaard, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero and Lars P. Osterdal Tags: Matching
Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn and Marco Slikker Tags: Game Theory & Graphs	A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive externalities Philipp Möhlmeier, Agnieszka Rusinowska and Emily Tanimura Tags: Game Theory & Graphs
Multicoalitional solutions Stéphane Gonzalez and Michel Grabisch Tags: Cooperative Game Theory	An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes Jean-François Caulier, Michel Grabisch and Agneszka Rusinowska Tags: Cooperative Game Theory
Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries Michael Hoel and Aart de Zeeuw Tags: Environment	Bottom-Up Strategic Linking of Carbon Markets: Which Climate Coalitions Would Farsighted Players Form? Jobst Heitzig Tags: Environment
The Transmission of Sustainable Harvesting Norms When Agents Are Conditionally Cooperative Andries Richter and Johan Grasman Tags: Environment	The Global Emission Game: On the Impact of Strategic Interactions Between Countries on the Existence and the Properties of Nash Equilibria Mélanie Heugues Tags: Environment
How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach Pierre Dehez and Samuel Ferey Tags: Cooperative Game Theory	A concise axiomatization of a Shapley-type value for stochastic coalition processes Ulrich Faigle, Michel Grabisch Tags: Coalition Formation Theory
Allocation rules for coalitional network games Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch Tags: Coalition Formation Theory	Bargaining and Power Dominik Karos Tags: Coalition Formation Theory
Bargaining and Delay in Trading Networks Mikel Bedayo, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch Tags: Bargaining Theory	Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch Tags: Bargaining Theory
On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Arkadi Predtetchinski Tags: Bargaining Theory	An application of wage bargaining to price negotiation with discount factors varying in time Ahmet Ozkardas and Agnieszka Rusinowska Tags: Bargaining Theory

Search form

You are here

Working papers

2013

Pages